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TOWARDS A DEFENCE
OF ENTRAPMENT
By

ROBERT K. PATERSON*

I.

INTRODUCTION
Recently, Canada seems to have become a centre for allegations involving lawlessness by police officers. Civil rights advocates have expressed concern that these revelations have not given rise to the level of public concern
and disapprobation that would seem appropriate. Apart from lack of proof
in specific instances, the justification for this inertia seems to be a widespread
belief in the fundamental honesty of our law enforcement agencies and a
sympathy for the difficulty of the policeman's task.
Few reported cases provide illustrations of the problem of police excess
in the context of individual trials. In R. v. Kirzner,' the Chief Justice discussed at some length the approach Canadian courts might adopt toward allegations of entrapment by peace officers. The accused in Kirzner had been
convicted of two possessory drug offences after a jury trial. Prior to the circumstances that led to his arrest, he had been used as a decoy and informant
in connection with R.C.M.P. investigations. His claim was that he had made
the purchase giving rise to his arrest as part of a general agreement with the
R.C.M.P. to buy drugs on their behalf. The accused's R.C.M.P. contact gave
evidence that he had not been told by the accused that the latter was selling
drugs. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that the conduct of the accused
was entirely of his own responsibility and had not been concocted or acquiesced in by the police to ensnare him. Laskin C.J.C. considered that the
accused was simply trying to use his police contacts as a shield for his own
activities. The Supreme Court was unanimous in its view that the evidence
did not amount to entrapment by the police. On appeal, the Ontario Court of
Appeal had held that it was not possible to raise entrapment as a defence in
Canada.2 The majority of the Supreme Court, in a brief comment, declined
to express any opinion on whether entrapment was available as a defence in
Canada. The main significance of the decision is the more thorough judgment
of Chief Justice Laskin, in which three other justices concurred. The Chief
Justice surveyed approaches taken both in Canada and elsewhere regarding
police ensnarement. His finding was simply that he would not endorse the
view that entrapment was not a defence in Canada-but beyond that he declined to go.
II.

JUDICIAL TOLERANCE OF COVERT POLICE ACTIVITY
Along with recent allegations of illegal break-ins and surveillance meth@Copyright, 1979, Robert K. Paterson.
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia.
1 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 487, 81 D.L.R. (3d) 229, 38 C.C.C. (2d) 131, 1 C.R. (3d) 138.
2
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ods, there appears to have been considerable growth in the use of undercover agents by Canadian police forces, particularly in connection with the
drug issue. Public confidence in the police seems to prevail as well in the
response of our courts to undercover police operations. This is confirmed by
the recent remarks of Laskin C.J.C. in R. v. Kirzner when he commented:
The use of spies and informers is an inevitable requirement for detection of consensual crimes and of discouraging their commission; otherwise, it would be necessary to await a complaint by a "victim" or to try to apprehend offenders in
flagrante delicto, an exercise not likely to be crowned with much success. Such
practices do not involve such dirty tricks as to be offensive to the integrity of the
judicial process. Nor can objection on this ground be taken to the use of decoys
who provide
the opportunity to others intent upon the commission of a consensual
offence. 3
Since the primary function of the police is to detect criminal behaviour, it is
obvious that they will utilize a variety of tactics to do so. Any interference by
the courts or Parliament in the use of these methods will have to be based
on a distinction between conduct that is tolerable and conduct that is not.
The statement of the Chief Justice accurately reflects the law in Canada and
the United States-that the mere use of spies and informants per se is not illegal. This does not mean that it should continue to be so. One could argue
that such behaviour is as immoral as the conduct of the person at whose apprehension it is directed. Further, many consensual crimes involve no identifiable victim, in the ordinary sense; thus, certain conduct is penalized on more
vague grounds of morality or societal stability.
Continued tolerance of such modern policing devices as tactical units
and stop and search techniques is founded on assumptions about the extent
to which such methods actually deter crime and lead to the arrest of offenders.
Critics of the new sophistication in police methods emphasize instead its
creative aspects.4 They argue that in their zeal to prevent crime, the police
may in fact increase it by furnishing funds to criminals and by otherwise
providing a favourable climate for criminal activities. There are more specific
risks involved in undercover operations, too, such as the commission of
crimes other than those envisaged by the police.
The reasons for the expansion of police undercover work are varied;
possibly the most obvious is the growth in the size and sophistication of
police forces. The trend towards police bureaucratization and the questioning
by criminologists and others of traditional police methodology have led to
police experimentation with new practices. Informers are often co-operative
police witnesses, anxious to avoid charges against themselves. Since the evidence of informers is admissible and the courts have not seen their use by
the police as improper, there have been no significant reasons for the police
to stop using them.
Recognition by our courts or by Parliament of a defence in entrapment
would, however, constitute a substantial limitation on the currently permissive context in which the police operate. In the discussion that follows, it
3

Supra note 1, at 493 (S.C.R.), 234 (D.L.R.), 136 (C.C.C.), 144 (C.R.).

4 See Marx, Undercover Cops: Creative Policing or Constitutional Threat? (1977-

78), 4(2) Civ. Lib. Rev. 34.

1979]

Entrapment

will be assumed that some form of control on instigatory police behaviour
in the context of undercover work is justified, and an evaluation will be made
of alternative steps that might be taken, bearing in mind experience elsewhere
and the particular problems of the Canadian context.
III. THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING ENTRAPMENT
In Kirzner, the Chief Justice's definition of entrapment was modelled on
developments in the United States; he drew a distinction between police engaging in acts of solicitation or decoy work and situations in which they actively organize a scheme to ensnare a victim. This distinction' was restated
recently by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Russell.5
Commenting on two prior Supreme Court decisions, Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
for the majority, said:
Sorrells and Sherman both recognize "that the fact that officers or employees of
the Government merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of
the offense does not defeat the prosecution" [citations omitted]. Nor will the mere
fact of deceit defeat a prosecution .... for there are circumstances when the use
of deceit is the only practicable law enforcement technique available. It is only
when the Government's deception actually implants the criminal design in the mind
of the defendant that the defense of entrapment comes into play.0
This test was adopted sub silentio by the majority in Kirzner, since they
found that the evidence did not show "a police-concocted plan to ensnare
[the accused] going beyond mere solicitation."' 7 For the purpose of discussing
whether a defence of entrapment should be developed in Canada, the need
to draw a distinction between conduct that merely facilitates and active techniques of ensnarement will be assumed. The distinction is easier to state than
to apply. In a recent decision involving the meaning of the word "solicitation"
in section 195.1 of the Criminal Code,8 the Supreme Court of Canada had to
deal with the undercover tactics of the Vancouver city police. 9 There, a member of the city police vice squad dressed in casual clothes had driven an
unmarked police car around downtown Vancouver and stopped to look at
the appellant. She smiled at the officer, who returned her smile. After this the
appellant got into the officer's car and a conversation ensued that led to an
agreement by the appellant to engage in sexual relations with the policeman
for money. The appellate court did not think that solicitation had taken
place in these circumstances and no defence of entrapment was raised, but
the facts indicate that the officer, in returning the appellant's smile, had
invited her to enter his car and at least suggest an invitation by him to her
to offer herself for sex. 10 Spence J. in his judgment indicates this when he
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S. Ct. -1-637 (1973).
O1d. at 435-36 (U.S.), 1644-45 (S. Ct.).
7 Supra note 1, at 503 (S.C.R.), 241 (D.L.R.), 142 (C.C.C.).
8 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
9
Hutt v. The Queen (1978), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 95, 38 C.C.C. (2d) 418, 1 C.R. (3d)
164 (S.C.C.).

10 This officer's behaviour is similar to that of the police officer in Sneddon v.

Stevenson, [1967] 2 All E.R. 1277 (Q.B.). In that case, the appellant argued that the

police officer had been an accomplice, and that his evidence should have been corrobo-

rated. However, the court held that the officer had not been an accomplice, and that
insofar as he had enabled the appellant to commit an offense, his activities, if bona fide,

had been proper.
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says: "[W]hen one reads the statement of facts one wonders whether the
appellant solicited any more than the complaining officer."" The Hutt case
seems to be an example of police behaviour that was merely encouraging.,
For entrapment to occur, more active encouragement by the police is necessary.
In American cases, the additional ingredient required to establish that
entrapment occurred has been supplied by a variety of factors. Thus, in
Sorrells v. United States,12 the undercover agent repeated his request for illegal whiskey in the context of a sentimental reminiscence between himself and the seller over both men's wartime experience. In United States v.
Russell,'" the undercover agent had supplied an essential chemical for the
manufacture of the drug that formed the basis of the defendant's conviction.
A common thread in cases where entrapment has been established has been
repeated pressure on an initially
unwilling defendant to commit a crime,
14
eventually leading to his arrest.
In Canada and elsewhere, it is factors such as these that have led to
acquittal. Thus, in Lemieux,1 5 the police activity consisted of soliciting the
accused to drive two men to a house which they intended to break and enter.
Lemieux argued that, although he was aware that his passengers intended a
break-in, he was unaware that one of them was a police informant who was
soliciting the commission of the crime. The Supreme Court acquitted Lemieux, albeit not on the ground of entrapment. By doing so, the Court may be
seen to evince an even more liberal approach to police conduct that exculpates the accused than is suggested by the Chief Justice in Kirzner. In
Lemieux, the Supreme Court regarded lack of predisposition on the appellant's part to commit the offence as critical. It is the issue of the accused's
proclivity, which has caused so much difficulty in the United States, to which
I will return later in discussing what form of entrapment defence might best
be adopted in this country.
At this juncture, there appear to be at least four alternative approaches
Canada could adopt to deal with what is seen as improper instigatory behaviour by the police (hereinafter called entrapment) in connection with the
detection of crime. First, the status quo could be retained with entrapment not
being expressly recognized as a separate defence, but with such behaviour
being allowed to have an ameliorative effect on the accused in indirect ways
such as reduced sentences or the exclusion of admissible evidence. This is the
position in England and New Zealand. Second, legislation might be passed
making it an offence for police officers, and others involved in the investigation of crime, to behave in certain repugnant ways and to use unacceptable
methods. This would involv6 making entrapment itself a crime. Third, a
11

Supra note 9, at 101 (D.L.R.), 424 (C.C.C.), 171 (C.R.).

12287 U.S. 435, 53 S. Ct. 210 (1932).

13 Supra note 5. The defence was actually held to be unavailable to the accused,
since he was shown to be predisposed to commit the type of offence charged. See text
accompanying note 72, infra.
14See, e.g., Kadis v. United States, 373 F. 2d 370 (1st Cir. 1967).
15 Lemieux v. The Queen, [1967] S.C.R. 492, 63 D.L.R. (2d) 75, [1968] 1 C.C.C.
187, 2 C.R.N.S. 1.
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separate entrapment defence might be adopted, as has occurred throughout
the United States. This step would involve an assessment of the two principal
formulations by United States courts of a substantive defence, and the policy
arguments in favour of both. Finally, repeal of those "victimless" or consensual crimes which attract entrapment techniques could be considered. This
approach will not be discussed here as it involves wider legal and moral
issues outside the scope of this article. As well, the repeal of this kind of
offence would not, by itself, dispose of the problem since, as the Lemieux
case shows, entrapment methods can be used for other than consensual or
"victimless" crimes.
IV. NON-RECOGNITION OF ENTRAPMENT AS A
SEPARATE DEFENCE
Throughout the Connonwealth there has been continued resistance to
recognition of entrapment as a separate common law defence. The explanation for this reluctance is twofold. The first reason is stare decisis. English
and New Zealand courts have been unable to find any precedent for developing a common law defence of entrapment. 16 Courts in these countries have
shown no great enthusiasm for such a defence on policy grounds either. These
grounds have never been very clearly delineated. The most convincing of
them is a preference for the retention of the utmost judicial discretion and
flexibility in accepting or rejecting evidence. 17 Less convincing is the view that
a defence of entrapment involves open-ended policy questions that cannot be
incorporated in a precisely worded rule of law.
In England, there has been unanimous rejection of entrapment as a
defence. In a recent decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Lord
Chief Justice states: "We, therefore, feel it right to say that this doctrine,
given the unlovely name of 'entrapment,' does not find a place in English
law .... -118 Instead of recognizing a defence going directly to the accused's
culpability, English courts have seen evidence of entrapment as being relevant in two other ways-either as a matter affecting the exclusion of evidence,
or as a matter to be taken into account in sentencing. As to the latter, there
is the Court of Appeal's decision in Birtles,19 where Lord Parker C.J. reduced
the sentence because of the real possibility that a police officer had encouraged
the commission of the offences involved. As one commentator has pointed
out, however, this limited response is akin to sentence reduction because of
inefficient conduct of the case by the prosecutor. 20 It also leaves an accused
with a criminal record despite express recognition by the court that improper
police conduct led to his arrest.
The most common response of English courts has been to exclude evidence obtained by what the trial judge considers to be improper means. Traditionally in England, apart from confessions, there have been no exclusion16

See

R. v. McEvilly and Lee (1973), 60 Cr. App. R. 150 at 155-56 (C.A.).

f N.Z.L.R. 411 at 414 (C.A.).
1 R. v. Mealey and Sheridan (1974), 60 Cr. App. R. 59 at 63 (C.A.).
17 See R. v. Capner, [1975]
8

19R. v. Birtles, [1969] 2 All E.R. 1131, 53 Cr. App. R. 469 (C.A.), and see
Sneddon v. Stevenson, supra note 10.
20

McClean, Informers and Agents Provocateurs [1969] Crim. L. Rev. 527 at 537.
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ary rules of the kind developed in the United States. Instead, judges exercise
discretion to exclude evidence obtained by oppressive means. Often the undercover police officer or his agent have been key witnesses. To exclude their
testimony would often be to put the accused's conviction in jeopardy. English
courts have not hesitated to express their prejudice against instigatory behaviour by the police, but on the question of excluding evidence they have
always insisted that the discretion of the trial judge should be untrammelled.
In one case, Roskill L.J. stated:
[T]he mere fact that ... there was a possibility that the offence as it was ultimately
committed might not have taken place but for the intervention of the police is not
of itself a ground for the trial judge to exercise his discretion to exclude the evidence. 2 1

In that case, a police officer had received information from an informant about
a planned theft. He subsequently met with the defendant and volunteered to
assist in the disposal of the stolen goods. The trial judge admitted the officer's
evidence and his decision was upheld.
The position in New Zealand is similar. New Zealand courts are unanimous in rejecting entrapment as a substantive defence. In recent cases, they
have adhered to the distinction referred to earlier between the mere use of
traps or deception and active incitement or promotion of crime. In the most
authoritative decision, the Court of Appeal said that it felt this distinction was
a fair compromise between the competing interests of the police and of defendants.' - As we saw earlier, this also appears to be the attitude taken by
the Supreme Court in Kirzner.
Unlike English courts, though, New Zealand courts have rejected the
view that evidence of entrapment can be taken into account at sentencing.
The position in New Zealand is now clearly that the trial judge has a discretion to exclude the evidence of an undercover police officer if it was obtained
by means of entrapment. 23 This choice was re-emphasized in a recent case
where the accused was introduced as a party to a drug purchase by an undercover police officer. 24 The true targets of the operation were the vendors of
the drugs involved, but the accused was also charged, as he had clearly
committed a crime. The evidence of the police officer was excluded because
of circumstances clearly indicating incitement and promotion. To facilitate
the transactions, the police had provided large sums of money and an aircraft. It was manifest that their aim was to apprehend the suppliers and that
the accused was merely a pawn in this manoeuvre. Mahon J. also noted that
it was insufficient to establish the disposition of the accused to commit a
drug offence. Instead, the question was whether he would have committed the
specific offences charged without the police instigation.
In R. v. Pethig, Mahon J. rationalized the New Zealand rejection of the
English sentencing approach. The judge felt that by taking the existence of en21 Supra note 16, at 155, and see supra note 18. Also see Heydon, The Problems
of Entrapment, [1973] 32 Camb. L.J. 268.
22
Supra note 17, at 413.
23 Id.
24

R. v. Pethig, [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 448 (S.C.).
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trapment into account only in sentencing, courts failed in their duty to make
clear their disapproval of such police behaviour by not allowing such behaviour to affect the guilt of the offender.25 In his view, the preservation of the
discretion of the trial Judge in this regard was a matter of deliberate policy
and in accord with a laudable concern for interests of fairness and justice.
These factors outweighed the interest of the community in having laws enforced and criminals prosecuted. In New Zealand, as a result of these two
recent cases, the sole means for dealing with entrapment is to give the trial
judge a discretion to exclude evidence obtained by such means. This position
accords with precedent and preserves wide discretion over the effects of
entrapment on an individual accused.
In Canada, by contrast, courts have taken diverse paths to find answers
to the entrapment problem. Until Kirzner there had been no discussion by a
higher court in this country of the adoption of a separate defence of entrapment. Instead of approaching allegations of entrapment by formulating a new
defence, Canadian courts have shown a preference for trying to deal with
entrapment by using existing concepts. In some instances this usage has been
entirely novel and sometimes awkward.
There has been no support at an appellate level in Canada for the view
that the correct method for dealing with entrapment is to exclude, where appropriate, evidence obtained by these means.
Since the law of evidence in Canada is much the same as that of England
and New Zealand, there is no apparent reason why a Canadian court could
not deal with allegations of entrapment through the exclusion of evidence. An
obstacle to doing this in Canada, however, is the decision of the Supreme
Court in Wray.2° Since that case, Canadian courts appear to have even less
discretion to exclude evidence than their Commonwealth counterparts. In
Wray, the Court decided that judicial discretion to exclude evidence arises
only when evidence is of little probative weight and when not to exclude it
would be unfair to the accused. The Court went on to say that no discretion
exists if the sole objection to admission is that it would tend to bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. In many cases, the result under either
the English or the Canadian approach would be the same. But striking differences could arise, and the New Zealand case of Pethig2T illustrates this dramatically. There, the evidence of the undercover policeman, once excluded,
led to the discharge of the accused. A similar result in Canada would be impossible if Wray were applied. The evidence of the police officer in Pethig
was too crucial to give rise to a discretion to exclude under the rule in Wray.
Thus, while courts in England and New Zealand have a considerable margin
of flexibility within which to operate and to achieve a significant degree of
control over police malpractice, the same is not true in Canada, where Wray
appears to establish clearly a rule that gives priority to the conviction of the
accused over judicial monitoring of police misconduct.
25
26

d. at 451-52.
R. v. Wray, [1971] S.C.R. 272, 11 D.L.R. (3d)

673, [1970] 4 C.C.C. 1, 11

C.R.N.S. 235. Also see Sheppard, Restricting the Discretion to Exclude Admissible
Evidence (1971-72), 14 Crim. L.Q. 334.
27 Supra note 24.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 17,

NO.

2

Earlier, in the absence of a recognized defence of entrapment, one approach taken in Canada was to find that the level of police instigation prevented ascribing responsibility to the accused for all of the requisite elements
of the crime charged. This explains the decision of the Supreme Court in
Lemieux v. The Queen.28 The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering. The facts revealed that the break-in had been solicited by a police informer who had instigated the commission of the offence. The owner of the
premises had also consented to the break-in and had given a key to the police
who lay in wait. In England, it had been held that such consent was irrelevant. 29 The Supreme Court in Lemieux allowed the appeal, however, on the
ground that the level of instigation on the part of the authorities had removed
responsibility for the actus reus of the crime from the appellant.30 With respect, this reasoning is confusing. By seeking to ascribe the activities of the
police to the accused, a court performs as artificial an exercise as if it had
sought to ascribe the intentions of the police to negate the mens rea of the
accused. The police do not want to commit the crime. They want to ensnare
the accused into doing so and in most entrapment cases it is irrefutable that
he has done so. The actions and intentions of the two parties are not related. 3 1
The proper course is simply to ascertain whether the accused has committed
the crime. In Lemieux, the feigned consent of the owner was clearly irrelevant. The inveigling activities of the police and their agents should have been
considered, if at all, as a matter of justification or excuse for the accused.
In Lemieux, the Supreme Court added that if the defendant had committed the offence then the fact that he had done so at the solicitation of an
agent provocateur would have been irrelevant. " - The comments made as
obiter dicta have been construed by some as rejection by the Court of a defence of entrapment. " " If the word "solicitation" was being used in contradistinction to inducement or instigation, then the Court may have merely been
saying that it regarded the defence as unproven if solicitation, rather than
instigation, had taken place. However, if a test of responsibility is to be used,
might not mere solicitation be seen as sufficient to deny the accused's responsibility for the actus reus of the alleged offence?
Lemieux was distinguished by the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court
28

Supra note 15.

29R. v. Chandler, [1913] 1 K.B.

125, [1911-13] All E.R. Rep. 428, 8 Cr. App.

R. 82 (C.C.A.).
3o Cf. Patterson v. The Queen, [1968] S.C.R. 157, 67 D.L.R. (2d) 82, [1968] 2
C.C.C. 247, 3 C.R.N.S. 23, where an element of the actus reus of the crime unrelated
to the undercoer operations of the police was not established, and the accused was
acquitted.
31 But cf. Watt, The Defense of Entrapment (1970-71), 13 Crim. L.Q. 313. Unfortunately, the flawed reasoning of Lemieux continues to escape detection. In R. v.
Burke (1978), 42 A.P.R. 132, 16 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 132, 44 C.C.C. (2d) 33, the Prince

Edward Island Supreme Court relied on the decision for the proposition that once entrapment was established it was open to a court to acquit for absence of actus reus.
32
Supra note 15, at 496 (S.C.R.), 79 (D.L.R.), 190 (C.C.C.), 4 (C.R.N.S.).
33

Cohen, Due Process of Law: the Canadian System of Criminal Justice (Toronto:

Carswell, 1977) at 392; and Sneideman, A Judicial Test for Entrapment: the Glimmerings of a CanadianPolicy on Police-Instigated Crime (1973-74), 16 Crim. L.Q. 81 at 83-4.
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of Nova Scotia in R. v. Bonnar.34 There, an employer of the accused hired a
private investigator to detect thefts from his warehouse. The investigator
made purchases from the accused and saw him put the money in his pocket
on each occasion. The Court thought that the consent to the theft simply
facilitated it and that there was an absence, on the part of the investigator,
of the inveigling behaviour that occurred in Lemieux. In other words, this
was not a case of entrapment at all and there was no call for consideration of
either excluding the investigator's evidence or of whether a defence of entrapment existed.
The most prevalent method of dealing with entrapment in Canadian
criminal trials has been by way of a stay of proceedings on grounds of abuse
of process. In R. v. Ormerod,"5 the Ontario Court of Appeal considered an
appeal against conviction on drug charges by a young man who had worked
undercover for the R.C.M.P. He claimed that this involvement afforded him
a defence. The Court did not think that persistent importuning by the police
was suggested on the evidence. Laskin J.A. (as he then was) denied that there
was any statutory basis for a defence of entrapment and said that to uphold
the defence would be to involve the courts in "a dispensing jurisdiction in
respect of the administration of the criminal law." 3 6 He did go on to suggest
that the doctrine of abuse of process might be a way for courts to do justice
in such cases, on the basis of the same Court's decision in R. v. Osborn.37
Osborn was later reversed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Canada.38 The
recent decision of the same Court in Rourke" has confused the meaning of
abuse of process even more, and further obscured the relationship of the
doctrine to entrapment.
The doctrine of abuse of process has not been developed by courts in
Commonwealth countries other than Canada. Insofar as a coherent theory
has emerged in Canada, the power of the courts to stay proceedings on this
ground seems narrower than perhaps was at first thought. The emphasis of
the power is the function it serves in preventing criminal proceedings from
being improperly instituted-to collect a debt or enforce some civil claim,
for example. Thus, to deal with entrapment under this rubric places emphasis
on the integrity of the legal system rather than on the rights of the accused.
Arguably, this is undesirable since it fails to relate the alleged police abuse
to the culpability or predisposition of the accused respecting the crime
charged. Accepting entrapment as an abuse of process has the effect of staying proceedings and acquitting the accused.
The judgment of Pigeon J. in Rourke leaves open the possibility that,
34 (1975), 11 A.P.R. 365, 14 N.S.R. (2d) 365, 30 C.C.C. (2d) 55, 34 C.R.N.S.
182 (C.A.).
35 [1969] 2 Q.R. 230, [1969] 4 C.C.C. 3, 6 C.R.N.S. 37 (C.A.).
36M.at 238 (O.R.), 11 (C.C.C.), 45 (C.R.N.S.).

37

[1969] 1 O.R. 152, 1 D.L.R. (3d) 664, [1969] 4 C.C.C. 185, 5 C.R.N.S. 183

(C.A.).
85, 1 C.C.C. (2d) 482, 12 C.R.N.S. I.
1 S.C.R. 1021, 76 D.L.R. (3d) 193, 35 C.C.C.
(2d) 129, 38 C.R.N.S. 268. See Cohen, Abuse of Process: The Aftermath of Rourke
(1977), 39 C.R.N.S. 349.
38 [1971] S.C.R. 184, 15 D.L.R. (3d)
39 Rourke v. The Queen, [1978]
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despite the denial of a general power in the courts to stay proceedings for
oppressiveness, there may be individual substantive defences that collectively
constitute a defence of abuse of process. 40 One of these may be entrapment.
An example of this approach is found in R. v. Shipley 4 1 where a County
Court judge stayed proceedings against the defendant on a charge of unlawfully trafficking in a narcotic on the basis of the Ontario Court of Appeal's
decision in R. v. Osborn.42 There was evidence of inducements being offered
to the defendant by an undercover R.C.M.P. officer which amounted to substantially more than mere solicitation. A similar case to Shipley is the decision of the British Columbia Provincial Court in R. v. McDonald.43 In the
latter case, the judge entered a stay of proceedings to a charge of trafficking
where the accused had shown reluctance to sell drugs and had sold to an
undercover police agent only after persistent requests by the latter and a
display of histrionics.
Notwithstanding that it may be possible to support the reasoning and
result in these two cases even after Rourke, abuse of process seems an inappropriate basis on which to deal with entrapment. The doctrine of abuse of
process is not suitably applied outside of prosecutorial process to matters
involving the investigation of crime. This was the view of McIntyre J.A. in
the Court of Appeal in Rourke, and was quoted with approval by Pigeon J.
in the Supreme Court. 44 Matters clearly preliminary to the proceeding and
preceding the indictment were not seen as proper objects for the trial judge's
discretion-a discretion which is more related to the misuse of the proceedings themselves. Thus, as a matter of principle, entrapment is not properly
dealt with under the inherent power of the court displayed in the doctrine of
abuse of process.
Until Kirzner, Canadian courts had taken a number of uncoordinated
paths in their search for a satisfactory basis on which to deal with allegations
of entrapment. These approaches illustrate the difficulty inherent in trying to
fit entrapment into pre-existing legal categories. At least the New Zealand
approach of dealing with entrapment under the judicial power to exclude
evidence makes for legal certainty and yet is sufficiently flexible to allow for
sensitive application. This approach ensures adequate protection against police
abuses while not hampering the apprehension of offenders committing particular crimes, such as certain drug offences and economic crimes. The New
Zealand statutory solution, in the absence of a separate statutory defence, is
an acceptable answer to the widely accepted view that there is no common law
defence of entrapment. This view is held in Canada; however, the divergent
approaches taken by our courts in cases of entrapment are unsatisfactory and
favour the introduction of a uniform judicial defence. The problem with the
New Zealand example is that a discretionary remedy, by nature, provides
little in the way of principles or guidelines for judges. This may be seen as
40

Id. at 1043-44 (S.C.R.), 209-10 (D.L.R.), 145-46 (C.C.C.), 272-74 (C.R.N.S.).

41 [1970] 2 O.R. 411, [1970] 3 C.C.C. 398 (Co. Ct.).
42

Supra note 37.
15 C.R.N.S. 122 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
44
Supra note 39, at 1042-43 (S.C.R.), 208 (D.L.R.), 144-45 (C.C.C.), 271-72
(C.R.N.S.).
43 (1971),
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inappropriate in a jurisdiction as geographically and culturally diverse as
Canada. If entrapment is accepted as a matter on which the accused is entitled
to introduce evidence, it would be appropriate that courts be provided with
some assistance by way of rules regarding how such evidence is relevant to his
guilt or innocence.
Before turning to the question of what kind of defence of entrapment
might be developed, another way in which evidence of entrapment could be
of consequence will be discussed.
V. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ENTRAPMENT
One response to the apparent widespread use of police informers and
undercover agents might be to make the instigation of offences by such persons itself a crime. To do so would be to dismiss entrapment as a matter of
excuse for the offender-irrespective of his predisposition-and discourage it
by making it criminal. This approach would meet the demands of those who
are concerned about entrapment being a defence for an offender (who, it is
conceded, has committed the crime with which he is charged) but are nevertheless eager for curbs to be placed on police excesses. The difficulty with this
argument is that many defences are available notwithstanding the presence of
all of the elements of the completed crime. Self-defence is an example. In any
case, where entrapment is not a defence, criminalization is of no assistance
to the victim of police misconduct.
Criminalization seems more capable of support in the United States
where courts have held that the defence of entrapment is not available in respect of acts of inducement by private citizens. 45 In Kirzner,46 Laskin C.J.C.
did not raise this problem beyond referring to the police or other agents.
Presumably, government agents of all kinds would be covered. Since, unlike
the United States, private prosecutions can be laid in Canada (for summary
conviction offences) there would seem to be less justification for excluding a
defence, at least where an information has been laid by an overly zealous
citizen. At present, the prerogative of the Attorney General to enter a stay
of proceedings should be a sufficient control device in cases of this nature.
On balance, the argument in favour of criminalization does not seem to
be a strong one. Given the traditionally close relationship between prosecutors
and policemen, it would be unrealistic to expect that charges against police
officers would be laid very often. This factor supports the adoption of a substantive defence which doubles as a restraint on police behaviour, rather than
merely making such conduct itself a crime.
Additionally, there is no doubt in Canada that the police, and their
agents and informers are not exempt from criminal responsibility once their
activities exceed efficient policing and become involved with the actual com4' Henderson v. United States, 23 F. 2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956); Holloway v. United
States, 432 F. 2d 775 at 776 (10th Cir. 1970). See also Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal
Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978) at 542. Quaere whether, in Canada, this would add
anything in light of the rules regarding counselling and procuring.
46 Supra note 1.
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mission of crime. 47 No general provision in the Criminal Code4 s extends immunity to peace officers, though there are some provincial statutes which give
relief in specific circumstances. 49 The distaste of Canadian courts for this kind
of immunity is illustrated by R. v. Ormerod,' " a case already mentioned and
with facts reminiscent of Kirzner itself. In the Ontario Court of Appeal,
Laskin J.A. (as he then was), after rejecting an allegation of entrapment on
the facts, went on to consider the appellant's claim to derivative immunity as
an informer. The Judge did not think that the appellant's activities, though
considered to be in bona fide furtherance of a police agency, were exempt
from being criminal. The case illustrates the invidious position of the informer, who is more likely to be charged than the peace officer, but who is no
more immune to conviction than the officers of the Crown. Moreover, it
demonstrates what may be a more constitutionally significant judicial reluctance to treat law officers any more kindly than ordinary citizens."'
If a peace officer or informant were charged, the nature of the particular
offence may affect the likelihood of his conviction. In theft, for example,
where the accused's actions must be without colour of right, the defendant
may escape conviction on the belief that he was acting with lawful authority.
The elements of other offences may not offer such an excuse, despite the fact
that the police were seeking to secure prosecution evidence. R. v. Petheran"2
is an example of the latter. The unfortunate accused was a policeman who
bought liquor contrary to a provincial statute and was the subject of a private
information, laid by his victim. The Alberta Court of Appeal was adamant
that his contravention of the statute was not justified simply because he was
carrying out his duties as a police officer.
The only recent official support for a new offence of entrapment comes
from the English Law Commission Report on Defences of GeneralApplication.
The Commission proposes a new offence of entrapment owing to the difficulties of drafting a satisfactory substantive defence. Under the new provision,
proceedings would be instituted only with the consent of the Director of Public
Prosecutions. At least one commentator has seen this recommendation as
simply a second-best approach that fails to deal with the fundamental problem
of entrapment. 53
47it has been suggested in the United States that police defendants might use a
defense of necessity in cases where charges arising out of undercover activity were laid
against them. See Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking (1974-75), 53
Texas L. Rev. 203 at 284. English and Canadian courts retain a healthy scepticism concerning the availability of such a defense in general. See Morgentaler v. The Queen,
[1976] 1 S.C.R. 616, 53 D.L.R. (3d) 161, 20 C.C.C. (2d) 449, 30 C.R.N.S. 209. In any
case, the elaborate preliminary planning, characteristic of undercover work, would be
inconsistent with the "clear and imminent peril" requirement of a defense of necessity.
48 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
49 See, e.g., The Police Act, R.S.A. 1955, c. 236, s. 14(1), and Tile Vehicles Act,
R.S.S. 1965, c. 377, ss. 119(4), 133(11) and 137(7).

50 Supra note 35.

51 See Parker, Comment (1970), 48 Can. B. Rev. 178.
52 [1936] 2 D.L.R. 24, [1936] 1 W.W.R. 287, 65 C.C.C. 151 (Alta. C.A.).
53
See English Law Commission, Report on Defences of General Application (Report No. 83, 1977); and Ashworth, Entrapment (3),[1978] Crim. L. Rev. 137.
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If a defence of entrapment were introduced to excuse the accused only
where there was no predisposition to commit the offence, then the argument
for criminalization is perhaps stronger. If this were the case, there would be
an unsatisfied need for a control device on inveigling police behaviour where
the defence was unavailable. It is this central question, of the formulation of
a substantive defence, left open by the Chief Justice in Kirzner, which is now
addressed.
VI. A COMMON LAW DEFENCE OF ENTRAPMENT?
Though the Chief Justice in Kirzner was reluctant to say whether an
independent defence of entrapment could be said to exist, the tenor of his
remarks indicates that he favours such a defence. He rejected obiter statements in the Court below and statements by the Court of Appeal of British
Columbia in Chernecki54 that there was no such thing as a defence of entrapment. The Chief Justice explained that section 7(3) of the Criminal Code
should not be regarded as having frozen the power of the courts to recognise
new defences.5 5 Thus, the Chief Justice would appear to have abandoned the
view he took in Ormerod that abuse of process was the appropriate ground
on which to allow the defence. 56
The function of section 7(3) has been primarily preservative.57 It has
given criminal defendants the benefit of defences available at common law
that are not expressed in the Code itself. While speaking of a precursor to
the present subsection, Russell J. of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court said in
1913:
I seriously doubt whether this provision was intended to affect in any way the
construction of the terms used in the definition of the crime. I think it was rather
intended to give a defendant the benefit of some common law excuse or defence
when all8 the conditions constituting the crime as defined in the statute were
presentfi
An example is the application of res judicata in the context of criminal
trials. The incorporation of this defence into Canadian criminal law has not
been questioned. Similarly, there is no good reason-apart from sheer novelty
-why a defence of entrapment cannot be incorporated in the same manner.
The arguments outlined earlier against dealing with entrapment under exist-

5 4R.

v. Chernecki, [1971] 5 W.W.R. 469, 4 C.C.C. (2d) 556, 16 C.R.N.S. 230

(B.C.C.A.).
55 R. v. Kirzner, supra note 1, at 495-96 (S.C.R.), 235-36 (D.L.R.),

137-38
(C.C.C.), 146-47 (C.R.). Section 7(3) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34,
reads as follows:
Every rule and principle of the common law that renders any circumstance a
justification or excuse for an act or a defence to a charge continues in force and
applies in respect of proceedings for an offence under this Act or any other Act
of the Parliament of Canada, except in so far as they are altered by or are inconsistent with this Act or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada.
5GSupra note 35, at 238 (O.R.), 11 (C.C.C.), 45 (C.R.N.S.).
57 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
58

R. v. Curry (1913), 12 D.L.R. 13 at 35, E.L.R. 11 at 37, 47 N.S.R. 176 at

210, 21 C.C.C. 273 at 301 (N.S.S.C.), aff'd (1913), 48 S.C.R. 532, 15 D.L.R. 347, 13

E.L.R. 550, 22 C.C.C 191.
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ing formulae also support the introduction of an independent defence. The
likelihood of this occurring in the near future, however, is slight. There is no
persuasive authority outside of the United States to support the existence of
a defence at common law.
The only judicial support in Canada for a more generalized approach to
entrapment, prior to Kirzner, is a decision of the Provincial Court of British
Columbia.59 In this case, involving trafficking in narcotics, Cronin Prov. Ct.
J. was satisfied that although the defendant had in fact trafficked in the drug,
he had been induced to do so by a police officer. The Judge expressed the
view that interests of justice and fairness necessitated trial judges' hearing
evidence of entrapment from defence counsel who offered it. In doing so, he
relied on an unreported decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal
that held it improper for a trial judge to rule ahead of time that evidence of
entrapment, which the defence wished to lead, was irrelevant. 06 He did not
think that entrapment had anything to do with abuse of process, but that it
was a separate common law defence. Hence, an acquittal was entered for the
reason that the accused had been induced to commit the offence.
Even if the judiciary remain unresponsive to these proposals, this does
not mean that Parliament could not introduce a defence of entrapment. In
1969, the Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections recommended
that Parliament do just that. The Report recommended that the defence
provide that an accused be not guilty if, in the absence of a pre-existing intention to commit the offence, he was instigated to do so by a peace officer or
his agent in order to obtain prosecution evidence.'; No action has been taken
in the decade since the report was published. Were the Ouimet Report's recommendations adopted, there would still be problems to resolve. The Committee did not explain what it meant by "no pre-existing intention." Does this
mean that if an accused were known to have a predisposition towards the
commission of an offence of the type with which he was charged, he could
not avail himself of the defence? Would this be a desirable result?
These kinds of questions relate to the content of the defence itself. The
only common law country with an established entrapment defence is the
United States. There, judges and lawyers have had a history of experience
with various formulations of a defence of entrapment. Before proposing a
version of a defence for this country, a survey of United States law and some
of its difficulties is offered.
VII. THE DEFENCE OF ENTRAPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES THE CRIMINAL CLASS NEED NOT APPLY.
Though entrapment is a defence in virtually every state and in federal
courts, its availability remains problematical. The Supreme Court's repeated

59 R. v. Haukness, [1976] 5 W.W.R. 420 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
0Id. at 433.
61 Can. Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections (Ouimet Report) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) at 75-80.
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division on its approach to the defence has prevented the emergence
of a uni62
fied theoretical basis for the defence in the United States.
The first United States Supreme Court decision was Sorrells v. United
States6 3 where the defendant had been charged with possession and sale of
whiskey in violation of the National ProhibitionAct. At his trial he relied on
entrapment as a defence. The court ruled against him and he was convicted.
A government agent posing as a tourist had visited the defendant at home.
The agent ascertained that the defendant and he had been members of the
same Division during World War I. He then asked the defendant twice if he,
the defendant, could get him some liquor. The defendant both times replied
that he had none. The conversation then turned to the wartime experience of
the two men. After this, the agent made a third request. This time the defendant complied and returned with a half gallon of liquor, which he sold
to the agent. The facts were thus rather like the undercover "buys" made by
police officers in the contemporary Canadian drug scene; the major differences
from a plain "buy" being the repetitive nature of the request and the appeal
to sentiment. The facts in Sorrells can perhaps be compared to a situation
where an agent4 feigns drug-dependency in the hope that a dealer will agree
to sell to him.
The majority in Sorrells held that the defence should have been submitted
to the jury by the trial judge. Their rationale for allowing the defence was
that the level of instigation by the government agent was serious enough to
permit the conclusion that it would not have been within the intention of the
framers of the statutory offence that a defendant be convicted in these circumstances. This threshold question of statutory interpretation goes to the question of whether entrapment can be available as a defence at all. It has been
dispensed with in later United States Supreme Court decisions, but it was apparently this concern with the concept of entrapment as a defence to conduct
that was clearly criminal that led to the adoption of this artificial rationalization based on interpretation of the statute concerned. In later cases, this
theory seems to have been abandoned in favour of a wholesale recognition of
the availability of the defence as a matter of public policy. The only remaining significance of this early explanation is that it proves that the defence is
not, as an outsider might surmise, founded on constitutional grounds.
In a later Supreme Court decision on entrapment, the Court did allude to
a possible constitutional ground for acquitting where entrapment, though
62 On the American approach to the problem, and for analysis of recent case law
and reform proposals, see: Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool
Pigeons and Agents Provocateurs (1951), 60 Yale L.J. 1091; Williams, The Defense of

Entrapment and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution (1959-60), 28 Fordham
L. Rev. 399; Park, The Entrapment Controversy 1975-76), 60 Minn. L. Rev. 163; Kadish
and Paulsen, ed., Criminal Law and its Processes: Cases and Materials (3d ed. Boston:

Little, Brown, 1975) at 1081-97. This is a small selection from a voluminous body of
literature, most of which is noted in the Park article.
6 3 Supra note 12.
64 There were similar facts in the second United States Supreme Court decision on
entrapment. In Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S. Ct. 819 (1958), an agent

met the accused at a drug treatment centre and after repeated attempts to arouse his
sympathy, induced him to procure drugs.
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proved, would be unavailable as a defence. In Russell, 5 the defendant was
convicted on narcotics charges after being supplied by an undercover narcotics
agent with an essential ingredient to manufacture a drug. For reasons which
will be explored shortly, the defence was not available and the conviction
was upheld. In writing the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Rehnquist stated
that if an agent's activities were contrary to "fundamental fairness [and]
shocking to the universal sense of justice,"00 they might violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court did not
elaborate further, but presumably such things as threats of physical violence
and the widespread commission of crimes by agents to establish their credibility would be within a due process defence. 7
There is evidence of a hardening of this attitude in the latest Supreme
Court decision on entrapment. In Hampton v. United States,0 8 the defendant
was charged with distributing heroin. The drug had been supplied to him by
government agents. All five judges of the majority in Hampton rejected the
availability of the defence of entrapment on the authority of Russell. Three of
the five were of the view that Russell was also authority for the proposition
that due process was not available as an alternative defence. These remarks
were only dicta, but they represent a retrenchment of the majority position.
In Canada, our Bill of Rights 9 might be fashioned to provide a similar
due process defence in appropriate cases, 7 0 though there is no judicial interpretation to support this suggestion. In Kirzner, Laskin C.J.C. did not refer to
the possibility and, given the reticence of United States courts to found a
defence of entrapment on constitutional precepts, it would be an odd reversal
of initiative for a Canadian court to do so. In Hogan v. The Queen,7 the Supreme Court of Canada held that contravention or infringement of the Canadian Bill of Rights was insufficient to render otherwise admissible evidence inadmissible. In this and other cases, the preponderant view has been that, notwithstanding similarities in language, the Canadian Bill of Rights cannot be
regarded as comparable to its American counterpart. Thus, while Canadian
judicial interpretation of the Bill of Rights is still in its infancy, there is nothing
to encourage resort to it by victims of entrapment.
While entrapment has been widely accepted as a defence in the United
States, no agreement on the nature of the defence has emerged. In Sorrells,
the majority explained that the elements of the defence involved the need to
show both that the act was committed at the insistance of government officials,
and that the defendant was not otherwise disposed to commit the crime. This
analysis substantially limited the availability of the defence to the accused in
65 Supra note 5.
66 id. at 1643.

67 See, e.g., R. v. Woods, [1969] 3 C.C.C. 222 (Ont. C.A.).
68425 U.S. 484, 96 S. Ct. 1646 (1976).
69 S.C. 1960, c. 44, as am. by S.C. 1970-71-72,

c. 38, s. 29.
See Cohen, supra note 33, at 385-95.
71 [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574, 48 D.L.R. (3d) 427, 18 C.C.C. (2d) 65, 26 C.R.N.S. 207.
See also Curr v. The Queen, [1972] S.C.R. 889, 26 D.L.R. (3d) 603, 7 C.C.C. (2d)
181; and Miller v. The Queen, [1976] 5 W.W.R. 711 (S.C.C.).
70
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criminal cases. It meant that if a defendant put in issue his lack of disposition
to commit the offence by raising the defence of entrapment, the prosecution
could then introduce evidence to the contrary. If the prosecution failed in
that attempt, the accused was innocent of the crime, though he may have
been responsibile for all the substantive elements of the offence. In effect, the
state, through its agents, is culpable in respect of the crime, as its instigator.
This version of the defence will be referred to as the "culpability defence."
The minority view in Sorrells is contained in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Roberts. This view ignores the predisposition of the accused and focusses
solely on the degree of instigation by the government agents. The minority
saw the true foundation of the defence in the public policy of protecting what
it termed "the purity of the government and its processes. ' - When threatened, the correct course of action is to disregard the guilt of the accused, stay the
proceedings and quash the indictment. Since there is no need to examine the
reputation or prior transgressions of the defendant, this will be referred to as
the "police conduct defence."
Despite the virtually unanimous adoption of a defence of entrapment in
the United States, the split outlined above survives. Under the culpability version of the defence, prosecutors have introduced evidence of past "criminal
conduct" by an accused for which he was never prosecuted. 73 Although some
courts have rejected character and hearsay evidence relating to prior unconvicted "criminal conduct," others have allowed hearsay evidence to be introduced by agents relating the information about the defendant that they
have received from informants.74 The practical effect of this evidence is seriously to reduce the credibility of the defence of entrapment raised by the
defendant, 76 even though the evidence is often unreliable and of dubious probative value.
It is important at this stage to clarify the meaning of the word "predisposition." In the context of the commission of crimes, the word has at least
four meanings. It could simply mean a predisposition to commit crimes in
general. On the other hand, it could mean a tendency to commit a specific type
of offence. Thus, if one were a known drug user with a record of drug and
narcotic offence convictions, one could be said to be predisposed to commit
offences of that kind. In a more specialized sense, predisposition could refer to
a tendency to commit the particular Code offence charged. Finally, it could
refer to a predisposition to commit the actual crime charged in the particular
manner in which it was executed. Proof of predisposition in all of these senses
becomes more difficult as one proceeds from the first to the last. The United
States Supreme Court uses the term in the second sense mentioned. To determine its existence, the specific circumstances of the crime charged are ignored
and an inquiry is made whether the accused had a general purpose to commit
a crime of the type charged, were he given an opportunity. This definition
Supra note 12, at 455 (U.S.), 217 (S.Ct.).
U.S. v. Brown, 453 F. 2d 101 (8th Cir. 1971).
74 See: Whiting v. United States, 296 F. 2d 512 (1st Cir. 1961); U.S. v. Brooks, 477
F. 2d 453 (5th Cir. 1973). But see U.S. v. Collier, 313 F. 2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963).
75
See Hardy, The Traps of Entrapment (1974-76), 3(2) Am. J. Crim. L. 165.
72
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raises immediate difficulties. 76 How close need the crime the defendant is
predisposed to commit resemble the crime with which he is charged? How
certain must it be that he would commit the offence in the absence of police
instigation? In the United States, some courts have been sensitive to these
problems. In one case, the Court held that predisposition to sell heroin was
not proved by the fact that the defendant was a user of the drug and had sold
it to support his habit. 77 Advocates of the police conduct defence cite these
problems to justify their argument that predisposition be ignored altogether.
Before examining the relevance of predisposition more directly, it is appropriate to consider whether evidence of predisposition, in each of the four
senses above, is admissible in Canada. The short answer is that in none of the
first three senses is evidence of character or predisposition admissibleY s In
each of these three cases similar fact evidence is inadmissible because its potential for prejudice outweighs its probative value. In the fourth category,
evidence of predisposition is admissible if it tends to prove that the defendant
is responsible for the specific crime with which he is charged. In this instance,
the probative value of the evidence outweighs the risk of prejudice. In the
House of Lords, Lord Salmon explained:
My Lords, evidence against an accused which tends only to show that he is a man
of bad character with a disposition to commit crimes, even the crime with which

he is charged, is inadmissible and deemed to be irrelevant in English law. I do not
pause to discuss the philosophic basis for this fundamental rule. It is certainly not
founded on logic, but on policy. To admit such evidence would be unjust and
would offend our concept of a fair trial to which we hold that everyone is entitled. Nevertheless, if there is some other evidence which may show that an
accused is guilty of the crime with which he is charged, such evidence is admissible against him, notwithstanding
that it may also reveal his bad character and
79
disposition to commit crime.

Whether evidence is relevant in this last sense, and therefore admissible,

is a question of law. One consequence of introducing a defence of entrapment may be to render similar fact evidence admissible as evidence to rebut
a defence raised by the accused. 80 If similar evidence is admissible, the trial
judge nevertheless has a discretion to exclude the evidence if he feels its prejudice to the accused warrants exclusion. This is not, however, an appropriate
place to embark on a discussion of the law of evidence. 8 ' It suffices to add that
in Canada there has so far been no opportunity for our courts to examine this
question. Were they to do so, the law on similar fact evidence suggests that a
balance would be struck between the probative weight of the evidence and its
76 See Dix, supra note 47, at 254-58.
77 Id. at 255.
78 Criminal Code,

R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 593. This section states that if an accused puts his character in issue by introducing evidence of good character, the Crown
can rebut this evidence by introducing evidence of its own as to his reputation and
prior convictions.
79 Boardman v. D.P.P., [1975] A.C. 421 at 461, [1974] 3 W.L.R. 673 at 706, [1974
3 All E.R. 887 at 912 (H.L.).

SOMakin v. A.-G. N.S.W., [1894] A.C. 57 at 65, [1891-94] All E.R. Rep. 24 at
26 (P.C.).
81 See Sklar, Similar Fact Evidence -

McGill L.J. 60.
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likely prejudicial effect on the accused. In the case of entrapment, the potential for prejudice is considerable. The probative value, on the other hand, is
questionable for basically the same reasons advanced to justify the inadmissibility of similar fact evidence. Evidence of predisposition to commit crimes,
a specific type of crime, or even the crime charged, does not offer proof that
the defendant has committed the actual crime of which he stands accused.
Probably the strongest argument in favour of the culpability defence is
that it focusses the relevance of entrapment upon the primary issue before
the court-the guilt or innocence of the accused. Under the culpability defence it is not denied that the defendant has committed the offence with which
he is charged, but evidence of instigation or inducement is admissible by way
of excuse. The prosecution can rebut this defence evidence by introducing
evidence tending to establish the defendant's predisposition to commit the
type of crime in question. 2 One advantage of this approach is that it shields
the courts from any charge that they are usurping the Crown's prerogative
power to pardon. Entrapment is seen as relevant only to the culpability of the
accused-the only issue before the court-and if it becomes irrelevant to that
issue by proof of predisposition, then it is a matter outside the court's inquiry,
perhaps warranting separate penalty.
Despite its appealing logic, the culpability test has drawn criticism for failing to deal with cases where there is clear proof of entrapment. In these cases,
once predisposition is established entrapment cannot affect the result. This has
been the case in many recent United States decisions involving drug trafficking.
One case in which the result was affected is Greene v. United States. 83 There,
the conviction of the defendants for illegal possession of a distilling apparatus
and sale of spirits was reversed. The facts reveal a remarkably elaborate
scheme by United States Treasury undercover agents to penetrate an illegal
whiskey organization. Entrapment was evidenced by the substantial involvement of the agents over a long period, during which repeated pressure to commit an offence was applied to the defendants. There was evidence also that
financial assistance had been offered. Nonetheless, it was held that the defendants were predisposed to commit the type of crime involved and were thus
unable to take advantage of the culpability defence. Despite this barrier, the
Court reversed, feeling that under its supervisory jurisdiction it could not
allow the convictions to stand. If the culpability defence is to remain, however, it is hard to see how it can be qualified by concerns about the level of
police misfeasance, short of express adoption of the police conduct defence
itself.
The emphasis placed on the character of the accused by the culpability
test has also been criticized. 84 In most trials, character is not of major significance. Under the culpability defence, the predisposition of the defendant
becomes a crucial factor. Supporters of the defence say that this is appropriate. If, they say, the defendant has commited a crime, he should be convicted, unless it appears that he would not have done so except for police in82

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, ss. 683 and 686.

83454 F. 2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
84

See, e.g., Donnelly, supra note 62.
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stigation. In deciding whether police instigation should be a defence for the
accused, the proponents of the defence argue that predisposition is relevant
in determining whether police activity was responsible for the commission
of the crime. The confusion in this thinking seems to have been in the mind
of Mr. Justice Mahon in the New Zealand case of Pethig.8 1 The predisposition
of the accused to commit a drug offence was said by the Court to be unconnected to the issue of whether he would have committed the offence in the
absence of the conduct of the police. Similar logic lies behind the policy of
the general rule regarding similar fact evidence restated in Boardman.8 0 Evidence tending to show that the accused is of bad character or repute is not
relevant to the question of whether he is likely to have committed a specific
offence at a particular time and place. Such evidence is equally irrelevant as
to whether an accused committed a particular offence of his own volition or
at the behest of the police or their agents.
Proponents of the culpability defence argue that the police conduct defence is misguided for allowing disapproval of police conduct to affect the
outcome of an accused's trial.87 One retort is that the cupability defence causes
discrimination against recidivists because it fails to realize that these persons
will need less inducement to commit particular offences than "ordinary law
abiding citizens." It is one thing for the courts to tolerate inveigling measures
by the police that do not amount to entrapment in the defined sense, but
another for entrapment to be unavailable as a defence to anyone with a tendency to commit a particular crime. Undercover methods are used mostly in
connection with the so called "victimless" crimes, where the participants will
nearly always be predisposed. To exclude an entrapment defence in these
cases is tantamount to failing to recognize it altogether. Whether this is a defensible result is discussed below.
VIII. A CANADIAN DEFENCE OF ENTRAPMENT
The police conduct defence represents recognition of entrapment per se
as justification for an acquittal. The basis for the defence was expressed by
Frankfurter J. in the first United States Supreme Court case on entrapment:
The courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not because his conduct falls
outside the proscription of the statute, but because, even if his guilt be admitted,
the methods employed88 on behalf of the government to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced

The learned judge went on to say that the culpability defence, which
looked only to the character and predisposition of the defendant, lost sight of
the underlying reason for a defence of entrapment-society's intolerance of
oppressive law enforcement. To adopt the culpability defence in his view, was
to discriminate against recidivists. Despite four Supreme Court majority decisions to the contrary, the police conduct defence has received overwhelming
Supra note 24.
86 Supra note 78.
87
See Park, supra note 62, at 224-39.
88
Sherman, supra note 64, at 380 (U.S.), 824 (S. Ct.).
85
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support from American legal scholars" and is included in the Model Penal
Code.
At the beginning of this paper, there was reference to the increasing
volume and sophistication of police techniques, including expansion in the use
of undercover agents. This kind of police work has primarily been directed at
the consensual or "victimless" crimes. Most reported Canadian cases where entrapment has been in issue have involved offences under the Food and Drugs
Act90 and the Narcotic Control Act. 91 Despite burgeoning police undercover
activity, there has been little effort by Parliament or the courts to develop
appropriate legal responses to meet the threats to individual freedom which

might arise in the context of covert policing. 92 Parliamentary inaction is probably due to a variety of political factors, including pressure from advocates of
"law and order" and the police themselves. Not only has Parliament been inactive, it has actually increased the effectiveness of such law enforcement by
enacting amendments to the CriminalCode expressly to allow controlled wiretapping. 93 Courts in Canada have shown a variety of responses to the entrapment problem-most of them adaptations from existing legal rules. In a
wider context, the law has shown no desire to increase its protection of the
rights of the accused. There is no prohibition on the admission of illegally obtained evidence in Canada 94 and nothing has been done to bring the due process provisions of the Bill of Rights95 to the aid of criminal defendants.90
The adoption of the police conduct defence could be criticized for producing the acquittal of offenders who would have committed crimes regardless

89 See Park, supra note 62, at 167. Professor Park himself, however, supports the
culpability defense.
This year the Supreme Court of California has also adopted the police conduct
defence. In People v. Barraza, 591 P. 2d 947 (1979), five members of a bench of seven
judges found that the risks of prejudice to the accused involved in the culpability defence together with the strong deterrent effect of the police conduct defence on what it
termed "lawless law enforcement" (at 955), overwhelmingly favoured the latter approach. The court went on to say, at 955:
Finally, while the inquiry must focus primarily on the conduct of the law enforcement agent, that conduct is not to be viewed in a vacuum; it should also be
judged by the effect it would have on a normally law-abiding person situated in
the circumstances of the case at hand. Among the circumstances that may be
relevant for this purpose, for example, are the transactions preceding the offense,
the suspect's response to the inducements of the officer, the gravity of the crime,
and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission.
90 R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27, as am. by S.C. 1976-77, c. 28, s. 16.
91 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1, as am. by S.C. 1972, c. 17, s. 2(1), and by S.C. 1974-75-76,
c. 48, s. 25(1).
92 See Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society
(New York: John Wiley, 1966). According to this empirical study, undercover operations do not necessarily give rise to an increase in instances of entrapment.
93 See Bums, Electronic Eavesdropping and the Federal Response: Cloning a Hybrid! (1975-76), 10 U.B.C. L. Rev. 36.
94 R. v. St. Lawrence, [19491 O.R. 215, 93 C.C.C. 376, 7 C.R. 464 (H.C.). See:
Heydon, Illegally Obtained Evidence (1) and Illegally Obtained Evidence (2), [1973]
Crim. L. Rev. 603 and 690 resp.; Ashworth, Excluding Evidence and Protecting Rights,
[1977] Crim. L. Rev. 723.
9
5S.C. 1960, c. 44, s. 2.
96 Supra note 70.
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of police intervention. The short answer to this criticism is that, in cases of
police instigation, the accused is not solely responsible for the commission of
the offence with which he has been charged. In Canada, apart from concern
with the civil rights of criminal defendants, there may be additional reasons
for the adoption of the police conduct defence. Presently in Canada there is
uncertainty surrounding the political and legal responsibility of the R.C.M.P.
In November, 1977, the Prime Minister stated that he had no intention of
interfering with the day-to-day operations of the force, unless ordered to do
so by the House of Commons. 97 The control and management of the R.C.M.P.
is vested by statute in the Commissioner, who is under the direction of the
Solicitor General of Canada. 8 Professionals in the Solicitor General's department number around eighty and lines of responsibility are not sharply
drawn. This makes less convincing the argument that the police are properly
responsible to their political superiors and thereby rightly exempt from
judicial censure. When to this limited constitutional and political responsibility are added the few judicial checks on police misfeasance, the position of
the defendant prejudiced by such conduct becomes unenviable.
The conclusion that Canada needs a workable defence of entrapment
is not incompatible with an appreciation of the realities of law enforcement.
Professor Park, in his extensive article, is critical of the police conduct defence for reasons connected with these realities. 99 He believes that neither the
courts will be able to administer nor the police to work with such a defence
in practice. This conclusion may have some justification in the United States
but there is no reason to accept it in this country. Instances of entrapment
will continue to be isolated occurrences in day-to-day policing. Judges will be
conscious of this as well as the danger of defendants seeking the defence in
inappropriate cases, such as Kirzner itself. There is no justification for the
view that our courts would not be able to develop and apply a defence of entrapment consistently and sensitively.
IX.

CONCLUSION

At present, there is no recognition of a general defence of entrapment in
Canada. The majority in Kirzner deliberately avoided expressing any view on
whether this recognition should be given. Despite the confusion created by
Rourke, it would appear that entrapment can still lead to a stay of proceedings
for abuse of process. The decision of the Supreme Court in Wray seemingly
precludes the matter being dealt with by trial judges in exercising their discretion as to the exclusion of evidence. Nonetheless, one could argue that a distinction should be drawn between unfairly obtained evidence in connection
with a crime already committed (which is admissible) and evidence of oppressive police behaviour contributing to the commission of an offence. It is

97 See: Trueman, "Can't tell Mounties how to conduct their daily operation,
Trudeau says," The Globe and Mail, Nov. 3, 1978 at 1, cols. 5-7; "Doesn't interfere in
day-to-day operations of RCMP, PM says," The Globe and Mail, Nov. 3, 1977 at 9,
cols. 1-6.
98Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, S.C. 1959, c. 54, s. 5.
99
Park, supra note 62, at 226-31.
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arguable that in the absence of a defence of entrapment, the latter should be
inadmissible. The approach of the New Zealand courts, summarized earlier,
accepts this proposition, subject to the discretion of the trial judge.
In Kirzner, the Chief Justice thought that if a full-fledged defence of
entrapment were now to be recognized it should be placed under section 7(3)
of the Criminal Code. If this step were taken, or if Parliament were to enact
a defence, the crucial issue becomes one of how the defence should be expressed. Assuming that a certain level of instigation and promotion is required by the definition of entrapment, debate will then centre on the relevance of predisposition on the part of the accused. The outcome of this debate will be determined by the importance one attributes to a defence of entrapment as a means of controlling oppressive police behaviour. Those who
are less concerned with controlling police excesses in the context of a criminal
defence will argue that since the accused has, in fact, committed the crime,
he should be convicted. They say that this result is a fair one unless it can be
shown that the accused would not have committed the offence but for the
police involvement. The main problem with this argument, apart from its
sophistry, is that it ignores the fact that, in most offences where entrapment
occurs, the existence of predisposition is seldom in doubt. For this reason,
there is merit in the view that predisposition be irrelevant and that the availability of the defence turn only on whether the accused can establish the
necessary level of inveiglement or instigation by the police or their agents.
In Kirzner, the Chief Justice left open the classes of offences to which
entrapment could be pleaded. As he points out, in crimes of violence there
will generally be no need for the police to resort to instigation. Usually the
victims of these crimes will be ready to testify independently. In addition,
there are policy arguments that can be advanced to exclude the defence in
respect of serious crimes. It is reasonable to expect that if Parliament were
to enact a defence of entrapment, it would exclude its availability for certain
crimes, as in the definition of the defence of compulsion in section 17 of the
Code. In the absence of this direction, the closest attempt of the courts to
formulate a test for the availability of a common law defence of entrapment
is the statutory interpretation rationale proposed by the United States Supreme
Court in Sorrells. However, as Roberts J. said in that case, that test would be
as illusory as leaving the matter to the individual judge in each case. One approach may be to adopt the reasoning of the common law authorities on compulsion, which excluded that defence for heinous crimes. Since the common
law was never clear as to which crimes were heinous, this may not be helpful.
A more workable solution may simply be to add to the defence of entrapment
the additional factor of the nature of the crime committed. In other words,
in determining the availability of the defence, the court should be required to
take into account the seriousness of the crime involved. 00 The more serious
100 See United States Model Penal Code: Proposed Official Draft (Philadelphia:
American Law Institute, 1962), s. 2.13(3):
The defense [of entrapment] afforded by this Section is unavailable when causing
or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other
than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
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the crime, the more serious the evidence of police instigation would need to
be to uphold the defence.
The Kirzner decision is disappointing in that it fails to indicate how our
criminal courts should deal with evidence of entrapment. Only the opinion of
the Chief Justice seeks to provide guidelines as to how courts might treat this
evidence in the future. This article discusses the arguments for and against
a substantive defence of entrapment. It is submitted that in Canada there is
a pressing need for an independent defence which ignores the defendant's
predispositions and focuses on the conduct of the police. One may respectfully
agree with the Chief Justice that it be placed under section 7(3) of the Code.
Such a defence would free our courts from the vicissitudes of abuse of process and the uncertainties of Rourke. In enabling judges to decide whether
evidence of police instigation is sufficient to allow the defence, we would
permit a new certainty in a cloudy corner of our criminal law. The case for a
substantive defence does not imply that we lack honest and efficient law enforcement in Canada. What we do lack are rules to ensure adequate protection against the possibility.

